likely to be linked via other contacts, such as sharing of equipment, direct farm to farm animal 26 movements and use of the same livestock dealers (p<0.001, p=0.02 and p=0.1, respectively). 27
The frequency of contacts was also investigated; it is likely that the amount of contact a farm 28 receives from a company or contractor and whether or not biosecurity is performed after contact 29 would impact on disease transmission potential. We found considerable heterogeneity in 30 contact frequency and that many company and contractor personnel undertook little biosecurity. 31
These findings lead to greater understanding of inter-farm contact and may aid development 32 of appropriate biosecurity practices and control procedures, and inform mathematical modelling 33 of infectious diseases. 34 contacts per farm over a two week period (Bates et al., 2001) , which is substantially more than 67 the 92 direct and indirect contacts per farm seen over the same length of time in the Netherlands 68 . In comparison, 50 contacts of people, animals and materials were reported 69 over a 2 week period during a study in New Zealand (Sanson et al., 1993) . 70
Such variability illustrates the structural complexity and heterogeneity of the contacts that 71 exist between farms, some of which can be represented schematically (Fig. 1 ). This could 72 potentially be described as a 'network' of contacts between farms which requires further 73 exploration. 74 is larger than or equal to the observed measure. All network structures were formed using 150 
Animal movements 185
The most commonly reported mechanism for trading animals was through markets (89% of 186 farms), followed by trading directly with other farms (73%), through dealers (50%) and to 187 slaughterhouses (50%). Markets and dealers were used most frequently for the sale, rather than 188 purchase of animals. Most farms trading with dealers used one dealer only. In contrast, most 189 farms purchased animals directly from other farms. The majority of slaughterhouse movements 190 were to a plant outside of the study area. 191
The combined 2-mode (having 2 types of node; farms and other organisations) animal 192 movement network involving interviewed farms and named markets, dealers and 193 slaughterhouses incorporated almost all of the farms in the study area into a single network 194 component ( Fig. 2 ; excludes farm-farm movements). The network visually exhibited a 'hub and 195 spoke' structure, described as such due to its similarity with the spokes of a wheel surrounding a 196 centre point or 'hub', in this case the local market within the study area. This market plays an 197 important role in connecting the nodes within the network. Although most farms used a single 198 market, one farm bought and sold stock through 5 different markets. 199
The 1-mode (one type of node only; farms) animal movement network involving farm-farm 200 movements appeared substantially different to the previous network (Fig. 3a) . This network was 201 fragmented and involved many movements of animals from farms outside of the study area. 202
Fragmentation of the network increased when only those animal movements between farms in 203 the study area were considered (Fig. 3b) . 204
The patterns of animal movements (M) were explored using hierarchical cluster analysis 205 which suggested three main groups (Table 1) . Farms in all groups purchased directly from other 206 farms and traded with markets and slaughterhouses. Farms in group M1 were solely reliant on 207 markets for sale of animals and didn't trade with dealers or sell direct to other farms. All group 208 M2 farms used dealers and did not sell directly to other farms. Group M3 farms all sold directly 209 to other farms and half used dealers. Although an uncommon practice generally, the hiring of 210 animals onto a farm occurred in M1 and M2 farms, but was not undertaken by farms in M3. 211
There was no evidence of differences between these groups in terms of hectarage, number of 212 animals, types of enterprise or in the use of companies or contractors (p>0.1 in all cases). 213 214
Stock on the farm not owned by the farmer 215
Twenty five percent of interviewed farms responded that they sometimes had other livestock 216 species living on the farm which were not owned by them. Of these 14 farms, 11 had sheep and 217 four had cattle from other farms. All of the sheep originated from premises in neighbouring 218 counties and all except one group of cattle were from locations within the same county but 219 outside of the study area. The remaining cattle source was located within the study area. 220 221
Contiguous neighbours and boundary fences 222
A proportion of the non nose-nose contact boundary fences were randomly selected and 223 examined on 43 farms. The selected fences on 19 farms (44%) were assessed to have no contact 224 possible through them (Fig. 4) . Of the fences that allowed contact, over 90% permitted contact 225 along only 1-20% of their length. Each farming unit (main holding plus additional premises 226 with stock) had an average of 7.3 neighbouring farms (median 7, range 1-17) and an average of 227 7.2 grazing fields with potential neighbouring stock contact (median 7, range 0-24). As some 228 neighbouring farms did not use perimeter fields for grazing, the average number of neighbours 229 with potential stock contact was 3.3 (median 3, range 0-10). 230 231
Types of indirect contact 232 233

Equipment sharing 234
Forty three percent of farmers stated they shared equipment with other farms, the majority of 235 farms sharing only one item (63%). Tractors, trailers and wagons were shared most commonly 236 between farms, followed by machinery for harvesting and ploughing, and muck vehicles. Waste 237 handling and feeding were nominated as the two most common tasks for which tractors were 238 utilised. 239
The 1-mode network arising through sharing of equipment was fragmented and involved 240 many farms outside the study area and farms within the study area that were not interviewed 241 (Fig. 5) . This network involved 30 interviewed farms including six that did not nominate 242 themselves as sharing equipment but that were nominated by other farms as doing so. Only two 243 of the relationships between interviewed farms were reciprocal, suggesting considerable 244 underreporting 245
Of the 24 farmers that reported sharing equipment, 12 stated that they did not perform any 246 biosecurity before or after using the items. Of the remaining 12, five farmers lent items; twowould clean on return and two would clean before lending the items, only one farmer did both. 248
Eight farmers reported borrowing equipment from others; five cleaned the items prior to 249 returning them (one cleaned only one of the three items borrowed) and two before using them; 250 again one did both. One farmer lent and borrowed equipment and is therefore included twice. 251 252
Companies and contractors 253
There was considerable variation between the number of farms visited by each type of 254 company or contractor and the frequency with which these visits occurred ( interesting to note that deadstock collectors figure in both groups and appear to be undertaking 277 biosecurity infrequently in both instances. 278
Cluster analysis was used to classify farms according to company/contractor usage ( Table 2) . 279
There was little evidence of clustering when considering all companies and contractors, whereas 280 three clusters (CC1, CC2, CC3) were evident when considering only those that entered stock 281 areas (Table 2) . Private veterinarians visited all 56 farms and were therefore not included in the 282 analysis. In group CC3 all farms were visited by milk companies, hoof trimmers and farm 283 assurance advisors; when looking at farm enterprise and farm size these farms were exclusively 284 dairies and tended to be bigger farms than those in the other groups. None of the farms in group 285 CC2 were visited by trading standards officers and only a few used animal hauliers; these farms 286 were a mixture of dairies and beef fattening farms. A large proportion of farms in group CC1 287 were visited by government vets, trading standards officers and animal hauliers; these farms 288 were a mixture of dairies, beef suckler and store cattle farms. There was no difference between 289 the groups with regard to types of animal movements (dealers, markets, farm-farm or direct to 290 slaughterhouse, p>0.2 in all cases) or herd size (p=0.2). 291 292
Attitudes to biosecurity 293
Attitudes of farmers to 19 biosecurity practices were examined by asking each farmer if they 294 thought each practice was very useful, useful or not very useful. A list of these biosecurity 295 practices can be seen in Appendix B. To explore if there were attitudinal similarities between 296 different farmers we again used hierarchical cluster analysis. It appeared that there were three 297 main groups (B1, B2, B3); group B1 were more likely to respond that the biosecurity practices 298 were useful (n=19), group B2 were more likely to respond that the biosecurity practices were 299 very useful (n=14) and group B3 were more likely to respond that the practices were not very 300 useful (n=23). This suggested three main attitudes -one tending to be very optimistic or very 301 positive, one optimistic or positive and the other negative or ambivalent. 302
To further explore this concept, we compared the biosecurity attitude clusters to the animal 303 movement clusters and the company and contractor clusters. There was no significant 304 association between farmers attitudes to biosecurity and their animal trading patterns (p=0.3). 305
The company and contractor groups varied with regard to their attitudes to biosecurity (p<0.1); 306 there was a significant trend for group CC2 to have more positive attitudes towards biosecurity, 307 compared to group CC1 (χ 2 for trend p=0.04). However, no difference was detected between 308 groups CC1 and CC3, or CC2 and CC3. 309 310
Employees and social contacts 311
Eighty two percent of farms employed other workers. Just under half of these farms (44%) 312 had employees that worked on other farms and approximately 26% had employees that ran their 313 own cattle enterprise. 314
Social interactions which involved visiting other farms were investigated as part of the 315 movement of people between premises. Farmers were asked to identify contacts with contiguous 316 neighbours, and with other farms. Forty one farmers (73.2%) responded that they regularly 317 socialised with one or more of their contiguous neighbours. Thirty two (57.1%) farmers 318 responded that they regularly socialised with people from other farms which were not 319 contiguous. 320 321
Additional premises 322
Fifty percent of the farmers had additional farms or other pieces of land separate to their main 323 holding on which cattle were run. Of these 28 farms, 19 had one additional premise, five had 324 two additional premises, two had three additional premises and two had four additional 325 premises. 326 327
Network correlations 328 329
Relationships between different networks were examined using QAP correlation. Those that 330 showed significant similarities (p≤0.1) can be seen in Table 3 . Contiguous farms were more 331 likely to be linked via various other types of contact. These included sharing of equipment and 332 social interactions (p<0.001 for both). Contiguous neighbours were also more likely to move 333 animals using the same markets (p=0.01) and dealers (p=0.1), and to have direct farm to farm 334 movements (p=0.02). In addition, equipment sharing and farm-farm movements (p=0.05), 335 equipment sharing and social interactions (p<0.001) and farm-farm movements and social 336 interactions (p<0.001) were significantly correlated. 337 338 339
Discussion 340 341
The aim of this study was to investigate the characteristics of direct and indirect contacts 342 arising between cattle farms which may potentially facilitate pathogen transmission. Broadly, 343 these contacts arise due to the movement of animals, people, equipment or vehicles, or due to 344 proximity. We have identified considerable variation in these contacts and in the structure of the 345 networks arising from these contacts. The study achieved a good response rate. This may be due to this area being used previously 363 in other studies conducted by the University, or the reasonably short time commitment required 364 of the farmers for participation. The effect of the non-participatory farms is unknown, although 365 the farms that did not want to take part were found to be typical of those in the area in terms of 366 enterprise suggesting that their activities would be somewhat similar to those interviewed. In 367 terms of network structures the inclusion of these farms would have been invaluable in 368 structuring more complete networks; it may be that some of the networks would be more 369 connected with fewer, but larger, components. Observation of partial networks is an issue in 370 this study; interviewed farms were able to nominate farms outside of the study area and as these 371
were not interviewed their contacts were not included. Such "boundary effects" are common in 372 network analysis, particularly where a small part of a much larger population is studied. 373
However, all parameters only refer to the behaviours of interviewed individuals in the study 374 area; we have not used network-level parameters. Therefore the results are valid for the 375 population described. 376 potentially increasing the exposure of the network to farms in a wider geographic area. The 387 trading of animals is a fundamental activity in livestock farming. However, farmers are able to 388 make choices with regard to the mechanisms through which they trade animals. We used cluster 389 analysis to classify farms according to their animal trading activities, resulting in three main 390 groups. These groupings, which could not be explained by simple measures of farm type 391 (hectarage, number of animals, enterprise), suggest that other factors such as previous 392 experience contribute to a farmer's decision-making process with regard to the sale and purchase 393 of animals. Given the recent trend in the UK toward increased reliance on markets for 394 movement of animals and a concomitant decrease in farm to farm movements (Robinson and 395
Christley, 2007), further investigation of the motivations underlying such decisions is warranted. 396
This trend is concerning as it is well established that trading through markets or dealers leads to 397 an increased risk of disease transmission; this can be due to commingling of animals from 398 various sources or factors such as transport increasing stress levels potentially exacerbating 399 latent disease conditions (Duncan, 1990; Barrington et al., 2006) . The fact that the majority of 400 farms in our study area used markets to sell stock and subsequently purchased directly from 401 other farms would be likely to reduce the disease transmission potential in this region. 402 403 
Stock on the farm not owned by the farmer
Contiguous neighbours and boundary fences 417
The potential for transmission of pathogens across farm boundaries depends on many factors, 418 including the type of perimeter fence existing between farms and stock concentrations on 419 neighbouring farms. Prevention of nose-to-nose contact across farm boundaries has been widely 420 recommended as a means of improving herd biosecurity (Duncan, 1990; SAC, 2002) . In the 421 current study, while many boundary fences perceived to prevent contact actually did so, nose-to-422 nose contact was possible with animals on adjacent farms in more than half. In most cases this 423 contact was possible over a relatively small proportion of the total length of the fence. The effect 424 of these contact points on the potential for disease transmission will depend on the proportion of 425 time animals spend at fence lines and their behaviour during this time which requires further 426 investigation. However, it is likely that such contact points reduce efficacy of these fences in 427 terms of prevention of disease transmission. 428 to do with other factors (such as politeness) than concern over biosecurity. It is documented that 439 contamination of equipment with mucus, faeces and blood can harbour organisms such as 440 Salmonella and Mycobacterium species; it is recommended that borrowed or hired equipment 441 should be cleaned and disinfected before it is used (Caldow et al., 1998) . Although the majority 442 of farmers did not disclose that they shared equipment, there was evidence of underreporting of 443 this contact, suggesting that it may be a more important route of transmission than indicated by 444 our data. Furthermore, many producers did not appear to undertake cleaning and disinfecting of 445 shared equipment, increasing the potential importance of this network in facilitation of disease 446 transmission. 447 448
Companies and contractors and attitudes to biosecurity 449
The number and frequency of companies and contractors visiting farms in this area was 450 substantial, suggesting that a median farm would have (on average) more than two visits per day 451 by personnel from an external contractor or company. Similar to the animal movement 452 networks, the networks arising through contact with specific companies and contractors 453 exhibited considerable heterogeneity. Several networks had only a few contractors or companies 454 contacting many farms within the study area. Others had a more fragmented pattern, with more 455 companies or contractors contacting only a few farms in the region. These differing patterns are 456 likely to reflect both the geographical range of the companies' and contractors' activities and the 457 differing number of farms they attend. It is also likely that those organisations having contact 458 with stock or going into areas where stock have access to will be of greater risk of facilitating 459 disease than those that do not. When considering biosecurity practices it appears that deadstock 460 collectors could be high risk; they clean and disinfect vehicles and personnel infrequently on 461 many of the farms in the study area and are likely to have contact with diseased animals. The 462 fact that muck spreaders visit more than half of the farms in the study area yet only cleanse and 463 disinfect their vehicles infrequently is of concern considering the many diseases which are 464 transmitted via faecal material. It is reassuring that private veterinarians and farm assurance 465 advisors appeared to cleanse and disinfect on the majority of farms; these professions should act 466 as advisors regarding disease preventative practices. The risk posed by a company of disease 467 transmission between farms ultimately will be a function of the number of farms visited, the 468 probability that they act as a fomite for a particular pathogen, and their frequency and efficacy of 469 biosecurity. 470
Cluster analysis suggested three farm categories on the basis of company and contractor 471 usage. Broadly, this classification system divided farms according to enterprise and farm size, 472
although it was not possible to group farms solely using these characteristics. 
Employees and social contacts 490
Most farmers in this study area employed people to work on their farms; many of these 491 employees also worked on other farms and/or kept cattle of their own. This finding is in keeping 492 with the current socio-economic trend in the farming community of greater numbers of part-time 493 employees (MAFF, 1998). Although the movement of people for work may aid dissemination of 494 ideas and innovation throughout the farming community, people may act as fomites, particularly 495 when minimal biosecurity is performed. In a previous study, Dutch dairy farms that employed 496 temporary workers who worked on other farms were 3.3 times more likely to be positive for 497
Bovine Herpes Virus 1 (van Schaik et al., 1998). This potential risk is also present for social 498 contacts, although there may be a low probability of disease transmission during a social visit 499 unless animals or animal areas are frequented. Nielen et al. (1996) in The Netherlands reported 500 that social visits were responsible for a substantial amount of contact between livestock farms; 501 visitors had contact with farm animals during 25% of these visits. 502 503
Additional premises 504
In this study, half the farms had additional premises for keeping stock and the majority of 505 these had only one additional premise. The use of additional farms or land parcels affects the 506 potential for farms to be in direct contact with other farms, and may increase the geographic 507 range of this contact, particularly when the additional premise is in a separate location to the 508 main premise. In our study several of the farms had additional premises adjacent to their main 509 holding, sometimes only separated by a gate and managed as a single unit. In this situation, the 510 geographic range of this contact is unlikely to be increased. 511
Network correlations 513
Whilst contiguous neighbours were clearly linked via common boundaries and general 514 proximity, such farms were also more likely to share other contacts, such as equipment sharing, 515 farm-farm animal movements and social interactions. This suggests that contiguous and local 516 contacts are multi-dimensional. Some of these relationships may be expected; farms that are 517 contiguous are probably more likely to establish social relationships, facilitating sharing of 518 equipment and potentially transmission of infectious agents via vehicles and personnel. In 519 addition, information regarding sale prices and recommendations of stock from particular 520 sources may be communicated within these social groups. Social contagion theory suggests that 521 individuals can adopt the attitudes or behaviours of others in the social network with whom they 522 communicate (Scherer and Cho, 2003) ; it may be this has some influence on farmer risk 523 perception in terms of trading with particular farms, dealers and markets and even attitudes 524 towards biosecurity. These similar risk perceptions could, in addition, work in parallel with the 525 cluster analysis groupings of farms with similar trade patterns and attitudes, and may assist with 526 the development of information dissemination tools in regards to herd health and disease 527 prevention. Whilst the role of different contact mechanisms in pathogen transmission is 528 pathogen specific, disentangling the components of "local contact" may suggest specific 529 interventions to reduce transmission via this otherwise undefined mechanism. 530 531 532
Conclusion 533 534
Contact between farms on a local scale demonstrates considerable heterogeneity; variation 535 exists between farms, between contact types and in the structure of the networks arising through 536 these contacts. Such variation may impact on the farm-level risk of pathogen transmission. 537
Despite this, there have been few investigations addressing these issues. Ideally producers and 538 herd health professionals would design tailored biosecurity programs to limit "risky" contacts on 539 each holding. In the UK this is, to some extent, carried out by private veterinarians, farm 540 assurance advisors and other health professionals. However, such programs focus only on 541 certain endemic diseases. Furthermore, individual farm programs are unlikely to be appropriate 542 during exotic disease outbreaks; similarly it is difficult to design policies for utilization during 543 epidemics that will be relevant to all farming situations. In this study we have highlighted 544 certain features which may be typical of other dairy areas in the UK. We have also suggested a 545 number of farm "types" based on contact patterns. Studies such as these in targeted or selected 546 areas of the country may bridge the gap between blanket recommendations and farm-level 547 programs and may be informative for risk managers addressing exotic and endemic disease 548 risks. Further research is required in order to determine the extent to which these concepts can 549 be extended to the wider UK farming community. Tables  639  Table 1 
